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Purvis 1
Introduction
In late September 1992, the District Court of Leipzig in eastern Germany handed down
an indictment of former East German judge Otto Fuchs. Shortly thereafter, Judge Fuchs and his
wife jumped out of a seventh story window. Fuchs was found in the morning, clutching his
wife’s hand as they lay, lifeless, on the cobblestone street below.1 This tragic act marked the end
of Fuchs’ story, and the beginning of another, for Fuchs was not the only one subpoenaed by the
Leipzig District Court that day. The court charged eighty-six-year-old Otto Jürgens with the
same crime, and unlike his colleague, who jumped to his death to avoid being brought to justice,
Jürgens decided to face his fate head-on.
These two men, only one of which lived to see his day in court, were being charged for
their roles in orchestrating one of the most notorious show trials in East German history: the
Waldheim Trials. The Waldheim Trials took place in a small courtroom at the East German
Waldheim Penitentiary in 1950, only seven months after the East German state was founded.
These trials, which were orchestrated by the East German, communist government, targeted
former Nazis as part of a broader “denazification” campaign designed to demonize fascism in the
wake of Hitler’s fall. 2 The Waldheim Trials were political show trials that were designed to
demonstrate the new state’s power and dominance over its Nazi predecessors.3 As such, they
represented one of East Germany’s first attempts to address Nazi crimes in a legal setting.4
Forty-two years later, during the process of German reunification, Otto Jürgens, the only living
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Waldheim judge, was put on trial in the East German town of Leipzig as part of the political
establishment of the new, democratic, unified German state. This thesis tells the story of that
later trial, described here as the 1992 Leipzig trial, and its significance within the context of postwar and post-unification German national development.
This thesis follows the narrative of the 1992 Leipzig trial, which represented the unified
German government’s condemnation of the East German judicial system and its legal practices
in an effort to bolster its own. Like the East and West German judicial trials that preceded it, the
1992 Leipzig trial was designed to carry out the political agenda of the government which
instituted it. In the case of unified Germany in the early 1990s, the government’s primary goal
was to drive the state-building process forward.5
This thesis argues that the 1992 Leipzig trial functioned as part of the broader political
process of state-building in unified Germany. This trial was designed as a critique of the East
German state and its legal system, which aided in the establishment of the new, democratic,
unified German nation. The trial also served as an expression of the new political and legal
norms in unified Germany, which, after the fall of East Germany, were derivatives of the values
that governed West Germany and its legal system. By condemning the legal values of the
previous regime and endorsing those of the new liberal government, the trial functioned as a
political catalyst for the unified German state-building process, at the heart of which was the
expression of new standards of justice structured around due process, impartial sentencing and
evidence accumulation. The 1992 trial also became a point of political contention in the midst of
the German unification period. The responses were divided along political lines with a portion of
the responses originating in former East German communities and the rest in former West
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German communities. Despite this division, both responses to the trial illustrate its purpose as a
pedagogical vehicle for the proliferation of new legal standards and norms in unified Germany.
As products of the unification process, which involved the merging of two distinct states
and legal systems, the political complexities surrounding the 1992 Leipzig trial, and the
unification process in general, had their origins in the political environments of East and West
Germany.
After the fall of the Third Reich, the German empire was divided into two politically
distinct states, each with their own interpretation of and approach to addressing the crimes of
their shared past. The East German state was founded in 1949 as a Soviet-occupied, communist
state, while West Germany was established the same year as a democratic state governed by the
Allied nations. In the wake of the Holocaust, these two emerging nations were faced with the
challenge of reintegrating into an international community that defined them by their atrocious
actions during the Second World War.6 After the German defeat, the occupying Soviet and
Allied powers expected a reckoning for the crimes of the Holocaust before they would support
the new Germanies, both politically and financially.7 This recognition of the crimes of the Nazi
era and public rejection of its fascist ideology became an essential way for the two states to
distinguish themselves from their political predecessor.8 In order to project this departure from
Nazism, the East and West German states engaged in “denazification” efforts designed to sever
their ties with the previous regime.
Despite this shared goal, the two state’s approaches to these denazification campaigns
varied widely from one another. The denazification campaigns of communist East Germany
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were informed by its totalitarian political structure and involved the proliferation of verbal and
visual propaganda, mass arrests, and the political cleansing of former Nazis and enemies of the
state.9 The West German denazification efforts were informed by the state’s democratic values
and entailed a more measured approach to targeting former Nazis. This involved the removal of
any Nazi officials from power and the public prosecution of former Nazi criminals, especially
those who participated in the Holocaust.10 As part of these denazification efforts, both East and
West Germany made use of their legal systems as vehicles for denazification as well as tools to
express their respective legal and political values. Decades later, the 1992 Leipzig trial became a
product of these contested judicial legacies.
In East Germany, the 1950 Waldheim Trials represented one of the clearest examples of
this state’s judicial approach to denazification. These trials consisted of a series of very short
hearings during which 3,400 former Nazis and enemies of the Soviet state were “tried” before a
panel of East German Soviet judges.11 As the presiding judges, Otto Fuchs and Otto Jürgens
sentenced all 3,400 of these individuals in a series of 10-minute-long hearings, conducted on the
basis of hearsay and political denunciations. No evidence was presented over the course of the
proceedings.12 The majority of the defendants were convicted and 32 were sentenced to death by
hanging or firing squad.13 These proceedings speak to the performative and political nature of the
trials, which, although typical of many totalitarian regimes, was the aspect of the trials which the
orchestrators of the 1992 Leipzig Trial of the Waldheim judges criticized most openly.
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Like East Germany, the West Germans held trials of former Nazis in an attempt to
criminalize the actions of the Nazi regime and bolster their own legal values. For example, the
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, which was conducted in West Germany in 1963, charged 22 former
high and low-level Nazi personnel for their role in orchestrating the Holocaust and managing the
Auschwitz work and death camps.14 This trial was conducted over two years and involved the
accumulation of evidence and the presentation of cases in favor of and against the accused. The
Auschwitz trials followed in the footsteps of other Holocaust trials carried out by western
powers, such as the Nuremberg and the Eichmann Trials. These trials, which targeted high-level
Nazi officials and organizers of the Holocaust, were a manifestation of the Allied states’
democratic legal values in that they prioritized the accumulation and presentation of evidence, a
practice that varied widely from the East German legal practices of the time.15 Similarly, the
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial was a product of the West German states’ democratic commitment to
due process and the establishment of an evidentiary record in the context of their legal
denazification efforts.16 This thesis shows that, like the trials of East and West Germany, the
unified German judicial trials, including the one which occurred in Leipzig in 1992, were direct
products of their political environment.
While trials are not the only way that countries have grappled with historical crimes, this
arena is particularly interesting because it functions as a site for the assertion of new legal
norms.17 This expression of new standards of justice is especially essential in the context of
transitional political periods. After the fall of the Nazis, the East German state used its legal
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system to communicate its values of political allegiance and dedication to the Soviet state.18 In
West Germany, the state used trials as a means of asserting new standards of justice structured
around the liberal legal values of due process and judicial impartiality.19 After German
unification, as this thesis argues, the new government used the 1992 Leipzig trial as a vehicle for
the expression of new, western-oriented legal norms. In this sense, the 1992 Leipzig trial is part
of a long tradition of German trials orchestrated with specific political purposes in mind, the
most notable of which is the pedagogical communication of new legal and political values.
Additionally, this form of historical redress allows for the crimes committed to be
officially documented as part of the historical record, which legitimizes and memorializes the
experiences of the victims and chronicles the development of the nation’s legal practices. This
function is especially necessary during periods of transition when states are concerned with the
establishment of new political and legal practices and values.20 Therefore, the theoretical
approach explored in this thesis uses the 1992 Leipzig trial as a lens through which to understand
the social, legal, and political developments which took place during German unification.
While there have been historical works that address trials during the unification period,
the 1992 Leipzig trial, which is at the heart of this thesis, remains unexplored. In general, there
are three categories of works that have informed my research: general works on historical trials
and their role as elements of the state-building process, works that discuss East and West
German trials, and writings on the state-building process and transitional justice in reunified
Germany.
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When it comes to more general discussions of historical trials, the works of Lawrence
Douglas, Charles Lansing, Christoph Burchard, David Cohen, Yuma Totani, Hannah Arendt, and
Renee Romano have all deepened my understanding of trials as vehicles for historical analysis.
With a specific focus on transitional justice trials such as the Nuremberg Trials, the Tokyo
Trials, and the Eichmann Trials, as well as the reopening of Civil Rights era cold cases, these
authors use historical trials as windows into the political and legal environments of different
historical periods. 21 Through the use of trial transcripts, periodicals, and personal accounts, these
works emphasize how certain trials highlighted the political, racial, religious, and social tensions
which defined their respective historical periods.22 Although these works do not focus
specifically on the German unification period, their analyses of historical trials as arenas for
socio-political discussions serve as inspiration for the structure and development of my
argument.
As a branch of this general legal analysis, a section of my source base grapples with the
role that the law plays in the construction of new states. These works, which include monographs
by Jeffrey Herf and Mary Fulbrook, identify the legal arena as a site for the expression of new
ideologies in the midst of political transition.23 These authors examine the German post-war
period and the development of the two states of East and West Germany through the lens of legal
practices.24 These authors make the argument that the assertion of new legal and political norms
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was an essential aspect of the state-building process in the post-war Germanies.25 Even though
these works do not address unification era trials specifically, their discussion of the post-war
state-building processes in East and West Germany serves as necessary background for my
discussion.
Building on this historiography, authors Rebecca Wittmann, Devin O. Pendas, Martha
Minow, and Falco Werkentin have written works that speak directly to post-war trials in East and
West Germany.26 These works discuss trials such as the West German Frankfurt Auschwitz
Trials and the East German Waldheim Trials in great depth and provide analyses that speak to
the importance of these trials as tools in the state-building process.27 As the political
predecessors to the unified German trials, the trials of East and West Germany illuminate the
important role that the law played in constructing a future for these two states. These trials, and
the historical works that discuss them, form the basis of my analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial and
the unification period.
As background for my analysis of unification era trials, I consulted historical works that
address the unification period and the political complexities surrounding it. In particular, the
works of James McAdams, Peter E. Quint, and Andrew Bickford include in-depth analyses of
the unification period, the constitutional structures, and the legal changes which came with the
merging of East and West Germany.28 While most of these analyses are separated from the
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study of historical trials, they provide necessary background on the unified German legal
structure and judicial practices during the 1990s.29
Finally, my analysis most closely relates to the existing literature which grapples with
trials within the German unification period. The works of Peter E. Quint, Andrew Bickford,
Martha Minow, Tina Rosenberg, and Monika Zorn all analyze unified German historical trials.30
The works of Quint, Minow, and Rosenberg directly address trials such as the 1991 Border
Guard Trials, which involved the prosecution of East German border wall guards who shot
defectors as they attempted to flee.31 However, their focus is not on the specific trial which I
intend to analyze. Along with trial transcripts, these sources all make use of press articles and
first-hand testimony, which are essential sources for my analysis.32 In that sense, these works
have both informed my understanding of unified German judicial trends and set an example for
how I should be addressing them.
Like many of my historiographical predecessors, my work is primarily a legal history in
that it examines a period of political transition through the lens of a judicial trial. This work also
contains elements of social history. These elements are especially apparent in my third chapter
which examines the German public responses to the 1992 Leipzig trial.
Unlike those legal historians who have preceded me, my work does not rely heavily on
trial transcripts because I could not get access to the Leipzig Court Archives which house the
transcripts as the result of the German data protection act. This act makes it especially difficult
for amateur academics to access information on individuals who may still be living, and since the
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trial was so recent, this act was a barrier to my research. In place of trial transcripts, I have turned
to personal interviews and newspaper articles from the time.
Throughout the thesis, I draw on interviews, which I conducted during my trip to
Germany in January 2020, and newspaper articles from the period to contextualize and to
substantiate my claims regarding the 1992 Leipzig trial. During my time in Germany, I was able
to conduct five interviews with a variety of subjects who experienced the unification process, the
1992 Leipzig trial, and the public reactions to both. While these personal accounts helped to
deepen my understanding of the trial proceedings and the surrounding political environment,
they cannot necessarily be taken at face value. Since these accounts are opinions, it is important
to consider the possibility of personal biases. However, these personal biases are interesting in
and of themselves. These testimonies speak, in part, to the public reactions to these trials and the
unification process on a smaller scale. Therefore, most of these sources have been incorporated
into sections of the thesis that discuss public opinion.
Additionally, one of my interviews functioned as a useful source for the events of the
trials, in light of a missing trial transcript. My interview with a Tageszeitung journalist who was
an eyewitness of the trial, proved invaluable in the development of my argument. The journalist,
who was one of the few journalists who covered the 1992 Leipzig trial and met defendant Otto
Jürgens and prosecutor Deitrich Bauer was an essential source both in my retelling of the events
of the trial and in my analysis of the political significance of the trial. The journalist provided me
with the intimate details of the trial proceedings, the reactions of the defendant and prosecutor, as
well as inside details regarding the public and press’s response to the trials. This information was
especially valuable for my second and third chapters.

Purvis 11
Along with my interviews, this work relies heavily on newspaper and law journal articles
published at the time of the trials. Articles from formerly West German papers Der Spiegel, Der
Tageszeitung, and The Nürnberger Nachrichten provided essential details that illuminate the
events of the trial, as well as information regarding the western reception of the trials. In order to
craft a comprehensive understanding of this perspective, I analyzed every article that discussed
the 1992 proceedings published by these outlets in the years during, directly before, and after the
trial.
In order to bolster my analysis of the former East German community’s response to the
trials, I relied on the formerly East German newspaper Neues Deutschland and analyzed every
article published on the trial between the years of 1990 and 1994. I also made use of international
tribunals such as Reuters News, the Wall Street Journal, and The Associated Press to
contextualize these local responses and illuminate the ways in which the international
community regarded the trial and its purpose.
Aside from local and international periodicals, I also incorporate analyses of westernoriented unified German law journals that address the trials and express specific opinions.
Journals such as Juristen Zeitung and Neue Juristische Wochenschrift published articles covering
the trial and analyzing its purpose in great depth. The western perspective that these articles offer
is especially useful in the context of my analysis of the trial reception and the political divide
which defined it.
As is the case with many works of historical research, this thesis is subject to a series of
limitations. The limited time frame in which I conducted my research contributed significantly to
my source-base and the scope of my topic. Due to the inaccessible nature of the 1992 Leipzig
trial transcript, my research rests heavily on newspaper articles and eyewitness testimony, which
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are inherently subject to bias. As a result, this work functions more as an analysis of the press’
responses and select public reactions to the unification process and the trials than an in-depth
discussion of the proceedings themselves. Additionally, because I was only able to spend a short
amount of time in Berlin conducting interviews and archival research, a lot of my analysis
depends on state records, journal articles, and press reports, which inherently express more of the
state’s intentions and sentiments than those of the German public. However, I made use of a few
select interviews and press articles to try and make the public voice more apparent.
Through an analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial, this thesis delves into the politically
complex history of German unification and emphasizes how the unified German state used its
legal system, and the 1992 Leipzig trial, as a means of establishing new legal norms and calling
the East German state to account for its judicial wrongdoings. As a state desperate to establish its
own political and legal identity, distinct from that of the East German regime, the unified
German government depended on the 1992 Leipzig trial to fulfill its political purpose and aid in
the establishment of new legal norms grounded in liberal judicial values.
This thesis is divided into three chapters and proceeding chronologically. My first chapter
discusses the unification period and the legal and political developments which paved the way
for the 1992 Leipzig trial. The second chapter discusses the trial itself and the elements of the
proceedings that were impacted by the political environment of unification. The third chapter,
which takes place after the conclusion of the 1992 Leipzig trial, examines the public responses to
the trial and the political divide which defined them. My conclusion highlights the significance
of the Leipzig trial in aiding the unified German state-building process and illuminates the
enduring importance of the trial’s legal legacy in modern-day Germany.
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Chapter 1
A New Germany: Trials and the State Building Process in Unified Germany
Years after its symbolic, and in places literal destruction, the Berlin Wall still stands tall
in the outer regions of Berlin. The wall was maintained in certain districts of unified Berlin, such
as the outskirts of Prinzlauerberg, in an effort to remember the nation’s divided history.33 These
sections of the wall are now adorned with photographs and placards memorializing the
unification event. The memorialized version of the wall tells a story of unity at a site of division.
While some pieces of the wall stand tall in the heart of the bustling city, other wall memorials are
located on the outskirts of Berlin, where the atmosphere is bleak. Upon visiting one of these
more removed wall memorials in Prinzlauerberg, I noticed a difference in the industrial
landscape on one side of the wall compared to the other. One side appeared to have been
developed significantly, while the other remained barren and grey. “That is old East Berlin,”
noted my companion, a former West German lawyer, “pretty sad, isn’t it?”34
“You know, it was an occupation, not a peaceful unification.”35 This statement,
expressed by one of my interviewees, highlights some of the politically hostile elements of the
unification process.36 As historian Andrew Bickford noted in his work Fallen Elites: The
Military Other in Post-Unification Germany, “West German elites felt that they could do as they
pleased” during unification. After all, the East German state had collapsed and they had won.37
According to Bickford, this triumphalist attitude on the part of West Germans represented a
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“general trend in the early years of unification, when large numbers of GDR officials,
bureaucrats, teachers, professors, and anyone whose loyalty to the new German state was seen as
questionable, lost their jobs… and were replaced with West Germans or East Germans who were
considered politically reliable.” 38 In legal terms, Bickford describes the notion of “disqualifying
justice,” as a form of punishment employed “even if [the East Germans] could not be held
directly responsible for abuses or illegal actions in the GDR.”39 Even though these punitive
measures were indirect, Bickford asserts their importance as the political and legal context for
the trials that followed-- including the 1992 Leipzig trial.
As this chapter will discuss, this political cleansing process was an essential aspect of the
German unification and state-building processes as it sought to establish a new German national
identity in the wake of division. This chapter will show how the West German legal and political
systems dominated the unification process in a way that condemned and excluded the East
German judiciary. Ironically, however, this attempt to unify the nation under one political
ideology and extend the western constitution and legal jurisdiction created even more political
resentment and division within the new state.
At its core, German unification was a politically partisan state-building process that
depended on the condemnation of one political ideology, namely East German communism, and
the proliferation of another, namely West German liberalism. This process, and all of the
complications associated with it, ultimately laid the political and legal groundwork for the 1992
Leipzig trial. Politically, the unification process involved the West German condemnation of
East German ideologies, which became a driving motivation for the trial.
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This chapter aims to place the 1992 Leipzig trial within the context of the relevant
political and legal controversies that arose during the German unification process. Through the
use of first-hand accounts of witnesses and German press reports, this chapter highlights the
politically divisive elements of German unification and the subsequent legal changes. It will
focus on the legal dynamics of the transition to a Western-dominated governmental system and
explore debates about the constitutional amendments that accompanied this process. Finally, the
chapter will discuss the trails of the Berlin Wall Border Guards, which served as important
precedents to the 1992 trial.

Political Unification
In the summer of 1989, months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the politically turbulent
nature of the looming merger was already apparent. Those both against and in favor of
unification took to the streets in protests and demonstrations that spanned the nation.40 As
Andrew Curry, a reporter for the West German newspaper Der Spiegel reported, those against
the merger were quickly drowned out by the significant demand for unification which came from
protestors in both East and West Germany.41 “We all went out to protest, we wanted to be part of
the West and we knew we had to fight for it,” recalls aformer East German citizen and political
activist.42 Despite the variety of smaller protests across the country, the epicenter of the prounification movement was the East German town of Leipzig, the future location of the 1992 trial.
From the beginning, the town of Leipzig played a significant role in the unification
process. Between September 1989 and April 1991, Leipzig became the site of the largest and
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longest pro-unification demonstration in Germany. Every Monday during this period, a group of
dissatisfied East German citizens assembled in public spaces in Leipzig, eventually filling Karl
Marx Platz (Karl Marx Square) and spilling over into the courtyards of St. Nicholas Church, to
demand rights such as the freedom to travel to foreign countries and to elect a democratic
government.43 These individuals called for the basic freedoms which the citizens in West
Germany enjoyed. Known as the “Leipzig Demonstrations” or the “Monday Demonstrations,”
given that they took place every week on a Monday, the protests were broadcast within Germany
and to countries across the world, with the New York Times referring to them as “the largest
[German] rally in decades.”44
West German press coverage of the protests prompted copy-cat demonstrations across
West Germany. As unification historians Hans Hoffmeister and Mirko Hemple explain,
individuals gathered in city squares and parks to demonstrate support for the Leipzigers and to
express solidarity.45 The Monday Demonstrations, which began in the church courtyards and
public parks in Leipzig, served as an initial catalyst for the unification of East and West
Germany.46
These protests were at the heart of the unification movement, and it was not long until
their demands were met. On November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, signaling the collapse of
the East German state and the reunification of East and West. The individuals who spearheaded
the campaign for reunification included intellectuals, layman citizens, religious priests who had
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been participating in underground GDR opposition movements, those attempting to flee East
Germany, and those disillusioned with the GDR’s political ideology and their repressive
governing tactics.47 These individuals, many of whom had participated in the Monday
Demonstrations in Leipzig, were considered the drivers of the “Peaceful Revolution”
(“Friedliche Revolution”).48 Later, they, along with the governmental figures who supported
their cause, would come to be known as GDR reformers. The protests helped to establish
Leipzig’s reputation as a city in favor of unification and against the oppressive power of the East
German state. In many ways, the 1992 Leipzig trial, which occurred less than a year after the
Monday demonstrations, was an extension of this political agenda.

Legal Unification and Constitutional Amendment
As was the case with the fall of the Nazi state, the collapse of communism and the East
German nation marked a point of victory for liberal democratic ideology. The subsequent power
imbalance between Eastern and Western ideologies went on to shape the course of unification
and the legal and political integration of the two states. As one of my interviewees put it, “the
West was absorbing the East, it wasn’t like they were meeting in the middle.”49 This
interviewee’s West German perspective in this instance is significant. The power imbalance
present during unification was so obvious that both West and East Germans recognized it.
Although this political impartiality didn’t come as a shock to most German citizens, this aspect
of the political environment during unification serves as the foundation for my analysis of the
trials which it produced.
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Many historical works on unification make note of this political imbalance. Andrew
Bickford, for example, focuses his analysis of the unification period on the impact that West
German political bias had on East German elites and state officials.50 As Bickford demonstrates,
East German elites were barred from participation in the new state based on their previous
political affiliations with the East German state.51 According to Bickford, this form of
punishment was not necessarily based on “what they did,” and their actions as members of the
Soviet state. 52 Instead, “they were punished for…who they were in the past, regardless of
wrongdoing, and because they ‘should have known better’ than to have served in what to West
Germans was…a ‘state without the rule of law (Unrechsstaat).’” By purposefully disqualifying
former East German officials from positions in the new unified government based on their
political allegiances, conspicuous political biases against the GDR’s ruling elite persisted
throughout the unification process.53
Despite this power imbalance, the former East and West German governments were not
entirely at odds when it came to their shared goal of merging the two states.54 In their discussion
of the Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, historians Hoffmeister and Hemple emphasize that
both East and West Germans participated in the demonstrations, thereby alluding to the notion
that citizens on both sides of the wall supported the proposal for unification.55 This public
cooperation was also present at the state level during the unification negotiations.
One of the more prominent dilemmas guiding these negotiations, and the issue most
relevant to this discussion, was the establishment of a unified German legal system and the
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potential drafting of a new constitution. At the heart of this discussion was the question of
whether the unified German state should be governed by a new set of laws which required
constitutional amendment on both sides of the east/west border, or if the unified German state
would be governed by the same constitution, or “Basic Law,” that existed in West Germany
before reunification.56 The former option, which involved the proposal of a “German
Confederation” in place of a unified German state, would allow the East German state to
maintain a degree of governmental and legal integrity, which made it a popular choice among
those East German citizens who were opposed to unification.57 The latter possibility would
involve the complete popular and constitutional absorption of East Germany into West
Germany.58 As historian Peter Quint articulated in his analysis of the unification process and its
political complexities, this latter choice meant that unified Germany would not be considered, in
the eyes of the international community, to be a new state distinct from its East and West
German predecessors.59
East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
discussed this concept of a German Confederation at a roundtable in West Berlin, and according
to a report published by German historian Volkmar Schoenenburg, both expressed initial
enthusiasm about the idea.60 However, when the possibility of complete constitutional and
geographic unification was proposed, this initial proposal was swiftly rejected.61 In a statement
broadcast to the East and West German public, Chancellor Kohl expressed his support for the
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West German absorption of East Germany and the extension of the Basic Law.62 The rejection of
the German Confederation proposal speaks, to the political power imbalance that defined the
unification negotiations.
Along with its impact on the state level, this imbalance was also a point of discussion in
the private sphere. In my conversation with former a East German citizen, she articulated her
concern with the West German absorption of the East: “It was almost as if East Germany was
erased from the map, which was definitely more practical, but, naturally, it left a lot of people
upset, I believe this is why a lot of people were angry and felt targeted by their government…we
all felt a bit left behind.” 63 This kind of resentment towards the unified German government
would later serve as the foundation for the East German critiques of the 1992 Leipzig trial and
other trials that surfaced in the coming years.
Despite some unrest within the East German community, East and West German officials
pushed forward with plans for complete unification. In order to facilitate the merger, the East
German Parliament (Volkskammer) passed a resolution on the 23rd of August 1990 declaring the
accession of the GDR (East German State) to the FRG (West German State), and extending the
jurisdiction of the West German “Basic Law” to include former East German territory.64 As a
result, the West German constitution was not amended in any significant way and any attempts at
merging the two constitutions were set aside.65 Subsequently, high-ranking officials and political
leaders from the GDR and FRG began negotiations regarding the peaceful judicial, political, and
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geographical integration of East and West Germany. The negotiations resulted in the signing of
the “Unification Treaty,” or "Einigungsvertrag" (Unification Treaty),66 which was approved by a
majority vote in the East and West German governments and signed on the 31st of August
1990.67
Even though this treaty passed, certain historians have identified the Unification Treaty
as being influenced by western triumphalist sentiments. As historian Peter Quint explains in his
work The Imperfect Union: Constitutional Structures of German Unification, the treaty was
designed to provide an underlying legal framework for the unification process and the extension
of the Basic Law’s geographical jurisdiction and the dissolution of the East German
constitution.68 Quint examines the political implications of the extension of the West German
“Basic Law” and the dismissal of the East German constitution on the political climate of
unification. He emphasizes the social and political impact that western dominance had on the
unified German people, the unification process itself, and, as this chapter will later discuss, the
trials it produced.69

Rehabilitation and Compensation for Victims of the GDR
Political-partisanship extended beyond the boundaries of Berlin’s legal chambers, as antiEast German sentiments continued to spread throughout the public sphere. Lasting narratives of
East German inferiority and West German triumphalism in the wake of unification created a
tense political and social backdrop for the unification process. Narratives of East German
inferiority, specifically with regard to the state’s legal system, abounded during the unification
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period, with many formerly West German papers and legal journals, including Der Spiegel and
Neue Juristischen Wochenschrift, accusing East Germany of being an “Unrechtsstaadt” (unjust
state).70 This claim was grounded for the most part in West German interpretations of lawless
and morally reprehensible behavior on the parts of the East German state, officials, and courts,
particularly with regard to their treatment of political adversaries or dissidents.71 The outrage
over the maltreatment of GDR victims would soon become one of the primary motivating factors
behind the unified German trials of that era, including the 1992 Leipzig trial.
At the heart of this social criticism was a discussion of the victims of the GDR. When
asked about those who suffered under the Soviet-run East German regime, one of my formerly
East German interviewees recognized their plight: “They were treated horribly, and everyone
knew that. That was part of the reason no one talked about it.” The maltreatment of victims of
the GDR was obvious to some East German citizens. However, given the constraints of East
German authoritarian society, it is not surprising that little resulted from this recognition.72 In a
2014 interview with the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT),
Professor Andreas Maercker, Psychology Professor at the University of Zurich and former GDR
prisoner recalled the ways in which he was maltreated by Stasi and GDR authorities: Maercker
specifically recalls instances of “beating, starvation, rape, electric shocks and long periods of
solitary confinement.”73 According to a survey conducted by the same organization of a number
of German rehabilitation centers, over 300,000 individuals were affected by these forms of
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physical and psychological torture under the GDR regime.74 After German unification, the
victims of the GDR inspired a nationwide campaign to secure reparations and rehabilitation for
them.
Initially, the drive to secure rehabilitation for victims stemmed from demands made by
the families of the victims, and their personal dedication to amassing evidence against
perpetrators.75 Victims and surviving relatives sought monetary reparations for their suffering at
the hands of the East German government76 The fact that these claims regarding East German
crimes played into the political narratives of East German inferiority propagated by the unified
German state, made their claims significant in the eye of the state.77 As a result, this campaign to
secure reparations for GDR criminals was soon picked up by the unified German government
and transformed into a tool to aid in the unification process. What started as a few, family-based,
claims for reparations and the punishment of perpetrators grew into much larger, governmentbacked, political and legal campaigns.
In the context of transitional justice literature, academics have scrutinized the significant
role that reparations, the voices of victims, and the demands of their family have played in the
construction of new states and the dissemination of political values. In his work Constructions of
Victimhood: Remembering the Victims of State Socialism in Germany, transitional justice
historian David Clarke identified the compensation of victims in post-unification Germany as
bolstering the narratives of western superiority during the unification process.78 As Clarke
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elucidated in his second chapter on victim compensation, the victims of East German crimes
“mobilized a construction of their own victimhood that presented their suffering as a heroic
contribution to the overcoming of state socialism and the eventual reunification of Germany.”79
Clarke emphasized the political role that victim compensation played in the context of
unification.
Similarly, in her work Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after
Genocide and Mass Violence, historian Martha Minow examines the various purposes that
reparations served in the context of transitional justice periods throughout history.80 Citing the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the conclusion of Apartheid and the
Holocaust reparation campaigns championed by the West German government after the Second
World War, Minow identifies reparations as “crucial elements” for the restoration of justice,
community, and nationhood.81 Minow claims that reparations not only help victims and their
families achieve a sense of justice, but they also help to bind communities together and aid in the
state-building process.82 In the context of German unification, it would make sense that this
desire to reestablish a sense of German community and nationhood was paramount to the unified
German government. In that sense, it follows that this political purpose served as an essential
motivating factor behind the reparations campaign. Although this is of course not the only
purpose of these reparation efforts, it is a significant one in the context of my analysis.
In an attempt to secure reparations for victims of the GDR, West German officials
inserted a number of clauses discussing victim rehabilitation into the Unification Treaty. For
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example, article 17 of this treaty outlined a plan for the financial compensation of every
individual who was considered a “victim of the SED injustice regime…to an appropriate
extent.”83 This article provided very little specification as to the process of identifying
appropriate victims and the degree of “appropriate” compensation which they were to be
afforded.84 In general, it suggested two possible approaches to GDR victim rehabilitation. The
first approach addressed the issue of the appropriate recipients of monetary reparations.
According to this approach, only those who had been victims of crimes considered illegal under
the GDR criminal code at the time should be afforded reparations.85 This meant that the
reparations were contingent on the historic illegality of the crimes committed, which was
determined by the GDR criminal code.
This approach was proposed in an attempt to avoid instances of retroactive justice that
were expressly forbidden by the Basic Law.86 Around the same time, similar concerns about
retroactivity permeated judicial discussions in other parts of Europe after the fall of
communism.87 Scholars in Hungary, for example, campaigned in a similar manner to prevent
retroactive changes in criminal law.88 However, in response to these requests, the Hungarian
parliament passed a law which extended the statute of limitations on crimes such as premeditated
murder and injuries causing death for an indefinite period, so as to allow persecution regardless
of the historic legality of the crime. According to the Hungarian government, a definite statute of
limitations “would prevent justice, and leave untouched the perpetrators’ own efforts to
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consolidate government power as a total shield against accountability.”89 This mindset parallels
the approach taken in unified Germany to questions regarding the retroactive compensation of
GDR victims.
The second approach ignored the historic legality of the crimes committed and
considered everyone who had been a victim of GDR injustice to be worthy of compensation,
whether their maltreatment was considered legal in the GDR or not.90 As the unification process
progressed, a shift towards this approach, which favored the legitimacy of all GDR victims’
claims to reparations, as informed by Western human rights standards, occurred as the result of
popular and political campaigns to delegitimize the DDR.91
While the Unification Treaty would have provided a good platform for this discussion of
GDR victim compensation, the treaty itself, along with the corresponding article, proved too
vague to offer any specific recommendations about what victims should receive. This was
partially because the responsibility of managing punishment and providing reparations was one
that the unified German government was not eager to take on.92 Given that the new government
was primarily composed of former West Germans or those who no longer felt an allegiance to
the East German state, it was difficult to compel these officials to pass a reparations law that
would reallocate thousands of dollars from their own budget to every GDR victim.93 It was
almost impossible to imagine creating a reparations plan or conducting legal trials without a
specific indication of who was responsible, who was in need, and how the reparations and
punishment processes were meant to be conducted. Therefore, it became essential for further
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legally binding specifications to be made as to how these processes would play out in unified
Germany.94 The result was the drafting of two specific statutes aimed at addressing exactly these
concerns, namely the first and second “Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice.”

First and Second Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice
The first and second “Statute(s) for the Correction of SED Injustice” addressed this
challenging issue of victim rehabilitation and compensation. The compensation in this context
was monetary and the rehabilitation of victims included therapeutic resources and aid for those
who had lost their jobs or struggled to find jobs as a result of prior East German persecution.95
The first statute focused on the rehabilitation of perceived victims of East German unjust
convictions as well as financial compensation for these victims. At the heart of this statute was
the statewide annulment of former GDR convictions and sentences that were deemed unjust by
the unified German courts. As a formal requirement for this annulment, convictions had to be
deemed “inconsistent with the essential principles of a free order [and] the rule of law.”96 One of
the offenses specifically outlined as having met this requirement was the undue persecution of
individuals based on political orientation. As the first article of the statue lays out, “oppressive
measures imposed by criminal authorities without a judicial order will also give rise to
rehabilitation and compensation.”97This statute went into effect on October 29th, 1992.
The second statute, which went into effect two years later in 1994, was devised in an
effort to provide compensation for victims of administrative prejudice and employment
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discrimination at the hands of the East German state.98 While the statutes did not specifically
outline the mechanisms by which individuals should be prosecuted for their crimes in the GDR,
they created a legal framework within which claims for retroactive rehabilitation and criminal
persecution could be processed under unified German law.99
While the newly unified German state considered the status of victims, it also turned to
questions regarding the punishment of the East German officials who had committed atrocities in
the GDR. The first statute for the correction of SED injustice specifically referenced the 1950
Waldheim trials and the offenses associated with them as a prototypical example of an Article
One violation.100 As Quint highlights in his analysis of the statutes, the first statute identifies the
Waldheim trials as “inconsistent with the essential principles of a free order in accordance with
the rule of law,” which established a legal precedent for the persecution of former Waldheim
judges and reaffirmed the invalidity of the East German judicial system directing them. 101 By
identifying the decisions made at Waldheim as crimes worthy of compensation and possible
rehabilitation for the victims involved, this statute fed into the narrative of East German
incompetency and judicial illegitimacy proliferated by the unified German government during its
state-building process.
Historians who have analyzed this particular moment of transitional justice in Germany
have identified a variety of ways in which the western government used their legal system to
exercise their authority over the east. In their works Fallen Elites: The Military Other in PostUnification Germany and Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification, unification
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specialists James McAdams and Andrew Bickford make note of the West German state’s use of
“disqualifying justice” to indirectly punish East German elites. 102 Bickford described
disqualifying justice, which was a term that McAdams coined during his discussion of the
unification period, as a form of punishment employed “even if [the East Germans] could not be
held directly responsible for abuses or illegal actions in the GDR.”103 As part of this punishment,
McAdams explains that these individuals were disqualified from full rights and participation in
the new state, based on their past affiliation(s) in the GDR.104 Even though these punitive
measures were indirect, both Bickford and McAdams stress their importance in the context of the
trials that followed. This political bias, which influenced the unification process at the state level,
had a similar influence on the unified German judicial trials of the period, including the 1992
Leipzig trial and the Border Guards Trials.

Trials of the NVA Border Guards
As a consequence of the precedent established by the Statues for the Correction of SED
Injustice, the unified German state conducted several trials with the intention of holding those
who had committed atrocities under the East German regime to account. The “Border Guard
Trials,” served as a primary reference point for GDR prosecution efforts during the unification
period. These trials, which were mandated by the unified German government, revolved
primarily around the criminal prosecution of former NVA (National People’s Army) guards and
officials charged with the use of deadly force at the Berlin Wall.105 Held in late 1991 and into
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1992, these trials were the first of their kind in unified Germany, and soon became a prototypical
example of the state’s attempts at grappling with their communist past.106 Much like the 1992
Leipzig trial, the prosecution of border guards occurred because of a popular and political push
to condemn the East German regime during a time in which this condemnation was central to the
unified German state-building process.107
The trials were originally orchestrated in response to the murder of political activist Chris
Gueffroy, who attempted to cross the Berlin wall only nine months before reunification.108
According to historian Tina Rosenberg, the unified German government felt compelled to indict
the four border guards on duty at the time of Gueffroy’s death based on the substantial evidence
gathered by Gueffroy’s mother in the wake of his death. Additionally, the Border Guard trials
served as an opportunity to put “on trial both the Berlin Wall and the system that had built it.”109
Based on this analysis, the trials did more than secure justice for the victims of the accused. They
also functioned as a means of furthering the new government’s aims to condemn and discredit
the East German legal and political systems in their entirety.
The most common allegations brought against the defendants of the Border Guard Trials,
namely former guards Ingo Heinrich, Andreas Kuhnpast, Peter-Michael Schmett, and Michael
Schmidt, were those of either intentional or unintentional homicide.110 Each of the defendants,
who had at one point stood watch at the Berlin Wall in an attempt to discourage or prevent
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instances of “Republikflucht” (“desertion”), was held legally responsible for the individuals who
they had shot at one point during their time on duty.
Each of the guards relayed a similar story, namely that they had identified a deserter,
called out a warning with a threat to shoot, and fired a set of warning and eventually fatal
gunshots thereafter.111 It has been common for the guards to receive praise from their superiors
higher up in the NVA chain of command in the aftermath of these shootings. However, after
reunification, these same guards who had once received praise and rewards for their actions were
now being prosecuted for these actions, publicly shamed, and labeled murderers.112 One of the
defendants, 27-year-old Ingo Heinrich, told the court “at that time I was following the laws and
commands of the German Democratic Republic.”113 He was not wrong. The GDR “Border Law”
of 1982 allowed for the use of deadly force in the case of felonies committed at the state border.
In this case, party desertions or border crossings were considered felonies under the GDR
criminal code.114 This clause made Heinrich’s actions legal under the East German criminal
code.
The judge, Theodor Seidel, a former West German resident, disregarded this plea and
sentenced Heinrich to three and a half years in prison for manslaughter. In a statement read out
loud as he pronounced his sentence, Seidel explained the reasoning behind his decision: “Not
everything that is legal is right.”115 This sentencing created a legal precedent for the criminal
prosecution of individuals who committed morally reprehensible acts within the confines of the
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East German legal system, despite claims regarding issues of retributive justice. This, in turn,
established a legal precedent which paved the way for the similar, yet more complex, 1992
Leipzig trial of Otto Jürgens.
As the next chapter discusses, the 1992 Leipzig trial aimed to facilitate the unification
process, which already had resulted in a great deal of division. While this trial was a clear
manifestation of West German triumphalism, it helped to establish and proliferate a new standard
for judicial treatment of the past and new legal norms structured around due process. This, in
turn, facilitated the unified German state-building process.
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Chapter 2
Trying the DDR: An Analysis of the 1992 Leipzig trial
On the morning of November 10th, 1992, a weathered-looking older man shuffled into
Room 115 of the Leipzig District Court House, flanked by his two lawyers. He moved slowly
and cautiously, leaning on his lawyer’s arm as he took his seat opposite the executive judge
Wolfgang Helbig, age 45.116 Reclining back in his chair, he smiled and reached up to remove his
hearing aid. He placed it on the table and winked at his lawyer.117
This aged defendant was former East German judge and lawyer Otto Jürgens. At age 86,
he was being tried for murder and risked spending the rest of his life behind bars. At the time,
however, his demeanor did not reflect that of a man threatened with years of imprisonment. In
fact, as the Tageszeitung reporter and legal historian who observed the trial, put it, “he looked
quite relaxed.”118 Perhaps this was because the crime in question had taken place 42 years
earlier, under a different regime and legal system, or because the charge itself was rather
unconventional given the details of the crime. Secure in his perception of his own innocence,
Jürgens sat back and watched as the proceedings against him unfolded, paying very little
attention and periodically feigning deafness as his hearing aid sat, unused, on the table in front of
him.119
On that morning, Otto Jürgens was being tried for his part in a set of show trials that had
taken place 42 years earlier in Waldheim, Saxony. In 1950, Jürgens and the two other judges
who presided over the infamous Waldheim Trials sentenced the defendant, Heinz Rosenmüller, a
prosecutor at the Dresden Special Court between 1933 and 1945, to death without any due
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process.120 Decades later, after German unification, that sentence was redefined and tried as a
form of murder within the context of an entirely new legal system. The Waldheim trials, in
which 3,400 alleged Nazis and enemies of the Soviet state were sentenced to death or life
imprisonment in a series of rapid-fire hearings, had come to be known across Germany as one of
the darkest chapters of German legal history.121
In light of the potentially illegitimate death sentences handed out at Waldheim, formerly
West German prosecutor Dietrich Bauer, who operated within the Leipzig jurisdiction, set about
accumulating evidence to indict Jürgens and try him for his crimes under the newly established,
and distinctly Western, unified German legal system.122 Bauer, a 52-year-old prosecutor from
Stuttgart, first became interested in the Waldheim trials in early 1990 when he discovered
evidence of Jürgens’ transgressions. As he sifted through hundreds of documents at the recently
dissolved GDR Interior Ministry, Bauer took an interest in Jürgens’ involvement in the
Waldheim Trials and was determined to bring him to justice.123
Based on sources such as the first-hand accounts of eyewitnesses and journalistic reports
covering the proceedings, this chapter will closely scrutinize the events of the 1992 Leipzig trial.
Unfortunately, the trial transcripts were not made available in time of this research, which is why
the chapter depends so heavily on additional primary sources such as eyewitness testimonies and
in-depth press coverage of the trial proceedings. This chapter will investigate the trial’s
indictment, proceedings, and sentencing processes, with a focus on the political intentions and
controversial outcomes of this legal spectacle. As the proceedings illuminate, the 1992 Leipzig
trial functioned as a political tool for the assertion of the West German legal values of due
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process, evidence accumulation, and apolitical sentencing. In specific, the transition from the
charge of murder in the first degree to “perversion of justice,” which is a charge that originated
in this historical period, highlights the trial’s function as a tool to establish new legal norms.
Judicial trials have long been used as a mechanism to redress crimes of the past.124
Historians who have studied moments of transitional justice in Germany and other countries
during the post -WWII and post-Cold War periods point to the use of trials in moments of
political transition as an indicator of a new state’s effort to promote new legal norms and assert
its faith in the rule of law.125 As transitional justice historian Martha Minow argues in her work
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence,
historical redress through judicial trials demonstrates a commitment to “the rule of law,” which
she defines as a “formal system itself committed to fairness and opportunities for individuals to
be heard both in accusation and in defense.”126 This interpretation of the law as fair and
grounded in due process is the product of a liberal legal tradition that emphasizes the importance
of objectivity, and the 1992 Leipzig trial served as an expression of these values.127
The use of trials as vehicles to communicate a message about the wrongs committed by a
previous regime is by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, some of the most famous trials of
this nature occurred in the immediate aftermath of World War II.128 Historians Martha Minow
and Pierre Hazan both cite the 1945 Nuremberg Trials, which were a set of trials orchestrated by
the Allied powers to address the crimes of the Holocaust, as an indicator of the Allies’ desire to
set a global standard for the treatment of human beings.129
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Like the Nuremberg Trials, the 1946 Tokyo War Crimes Trial, which involved the Allied
prosecution of several Japanese WWII war criminals, was foundational in the fields of
international law and transitional justice. This trial, which has gone down in history as the
quintessential example of “victor’s justice,” has been scrutinized by many historians analyzing
the role that the law played in the establishment of new norms for the treatment of “crimes
against humanity.”130 However, more recent contributions to the scholarship, including David
Cohen and Yuma Totani’s The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Law, History, and Jurisprudence,
have complicated this interpretation of the trial by presenting it as a rigorous judicial process
grounded in the moral and legal norms established by the international democratic community.131
In the wake of Hitler’s fall, these trials served the political function of communicating new
norms regarding the handling of human rights abuses such as the Holocaust to the international
community. Like the Tokyo Trials, the 1992 Leipzig trial was an allegedly rigorous judicial
process. However, this trial was also informed by political goals as well as specific moral and
legal values.
In the context of post-communist transitional justice efforts, the 1992 Leipzig trial was
not the only one of its kind. Several trials of this nature occurred in Eastern Europe in the early
1990s, which renders the Leipzig trial part of a larger international trend that spanned the former
Soviet bloc. According to historians Nadya Nedelski and Levania Stan, trials condemning the
actions of communist officials were quite common in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.132
This was especially the case in countries that constituted the “Soviet Zone” before the bloc’s
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dissolution, which included Poland, Hungry, the Czech Republic/Czechoslovakia, and East
Germany. 133 These countries used their legal systems to prosecute former communist leaders,
officials, secret agents, and other “compromised persons occupying certain post-communist
public positions.”134 Historian David Roman cites these trials as manifestations of the political
process of “lustration,” or political cleansing.135 In the context of the German unification process,
“lustration” is an apt characterization of the process of removing former East German elites from
office and prosecuting them after the regime change.
The Leipzig trial was different from some of its companion trials in Eastern Europe in
that it was more than a vehicle for “lustration.” The trial did more than seek to criticize one man
or displace former political elites. Considering that the Leipzig trial targeted a former judge, this
chapter argues that the trial had the effect of critiquing the entire East German legal system in
which Jürgens functioned and adjudicated. Furthermore, since the Waldheim Trials were
designed as a mechanism to grapple with the crimes of the Nazi regime, parallel to the western
process of reckoning with Nazism in the Nuremberg Trials, the act of indicting and trying a
Waldheim judge served as a broader condemnation of the East German state’s approach to
Germany’s shared Nazi past. The 1992 trial did more than set a standard for the treatment of
individuals under the unified German legal system: it aided in the legitimization of the unified
German state and the proliferation of its political values.
Amidst the hectic political environment of unification, one might wonder why West
German prosecutors would take the time and energy to put an East German judge on trial for
judicial actions taken forty years earlier. Why did the new state consider this trial important or
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necessary? As historian Mary Fulbrook explains, during the German unification period in the
early 1990s, the merging of East and West depended on the assertion of West German political
ideals over those of East Germany.136 The 1992 trial functioned as a key facilitator of this
transitional process by sending a clear political message that East German judicial practices were
inferior to those of the West. To that end, the court proceedings themselves reflected and sought
to demonstrate the due process and apolitical judicial integrity which defined the liberal legal
values of the early 1990s.137 Ironically, the political purpose of the Leipzig trial negates its claim
to impartiality, rendering it a clear political tool within the context of unification.

The Indictment
After decades of retirement, Otto Jürgens was once again dragged into the limelight after
West German prosecutor Dietrich Bauer took interest in him and his involvement with the 1950
Waldheim Trials. 138 According to historian Andrew Bickford, it was common for West German
lawyers to be involved in the dissolution of former East German legal and governmental offices
during the reunification period.139 A former West German lawyer remembered how many
lawyers, possibly including Bauer, were paid quite significant salaries to aid in the process of
firing and relocating former East German state and legal officials.140
This was the task that Bauer presumably set out to complete on that day at the GDR
Interior Ministry, however, his trajectory changed quite quickly when he stumbled across two
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boxes labeled “Waldheimer Prozesse” housed in the ministry’s archives.141 These boxes
contained stacks of paperwork detailing the events of the Waldheim Trials and the individuals
involved. One of those individuals was former judge Otto Jürgens, who became the focal point
of Bauer’s investigation into the Waldheim Trials, paving the way for the subsequent 1992
Leipzig trial.
Over the course of two years, Bauer scanned the archives in Berlin, Potsdam, and
Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten to gather as much information on the Waldheim trials as possible.142
Even though much of the information concerning these trials had been destroyed during the fall
of the Soviet Union and the purging of East German records, Bauer was able to gather enough
information to indict the three judges responsible for the judgments they handed out at
Waldheim.143 The local and national newspapers covering the trials made note of Bauer's very
apparent preparedness and extensive knowledge of the defendant and the Waldheim Trials. As
formerly West German Tageszeitung correspondent Julia Albrecht reported, “Bauer has done his
research, and his occasional smirk at Jürgens sometimes suggests that he could answer the
questions posed to the accused more accurately than the latter.”144
Despite his prominent role as the primary prosecutor in the Leipzig proceedings, little
information was made public about prosecutor Bauer at the time of the trials. Journalistic
publications that reported on the trials did not investigate the motivations behind Bauer’s
determination to prosecute Jürgens. However, as a former West German citizen, Bauer’s political
orientation likely stemmed from the moral and political values he grew up within West
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Germany. In my interview with formerly a West German journalist, she explained that “many of
us in West Germany were exposed to political propaganda about East Germans,” and it was not
uncommon for West German citizens to resent their East German neighbors.145 Even if Bauer did
not resent Jürgens outright, his sense of morality was likely informed by his West German
upbringing and the liberal legal tradition. As transitional justice historian Peter Quint elucidates
in his work The Imperfect Union, many West German citizens considered show trials, such as the
ones which Jürgens oversaw at Waldheim, to be wrong.146 Furthermore, the West German state,
like many other modern democratic nations, prided itself on its legal integrity and its
commitment to justice and impartial truth-seeking when it came to matters of the law.147
Back in 1950, Jürgens was one of two junior judges who presided over the Waldheim
Trials. The typical structure of an East German criminal trial required the presence of a senior
judge to preside over the proceedings, accompanied by two junior judges who assumed the role
of a jury.148 This meant that all three judges could potentially be identified and held responsible
for the events at Waldheim. Nevertheless, by the time Bauer had gathered enough evidence to
indict, the only living judge was Otto Jürgens. There was, however, no statute of limitations
pertaining to crimes of a high degree in Germany, including murder with intent, or any crimes
resulting in death, as cited in the German Criminal Code.149
As a result, it was possible to legally indict the Waldheim judges for the crimes they
committed 42 years prior by filing an accusation of murder or manslaughter, which is exactly
what Bauer did. 150 The Waldheim judges had sentenced to death—or killed, as Bauer described
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it —32 prisoners, including lawyer and journalist Heinz Rosenmüller. After being imprisoned at
Waldheim, Rosenmüller was executed on the evening of November 4th, 1950.151After two years
of research, Bauer filed a charge of murder against Jürgens based on the argument that his death
sentence led to the slaughter of an innocent man.152 The Leipzig District court was then
compelled to prosecute, considering that an accusation of murder, substantiated by significant
evidence, had been presented.153
According to a reporter who attended the trial and covered it for West German newspaper
Die Tageszeitung, there was very little governmental pushback when it came to indicting
Jürgens, even though the crime could be considered a rather unconventional form of murder.154
German newspapers from the time paid little attention to the indictment, suggesting that it did
not create a great deal of controversy.155The fact that the state did not challenge the charge
before the indictment suggests that the unified German government accepted Bauer’s unique
interpretation of murder in this context.

The Proceedings
The Leipzig trial of Otto Jürgens took place over 10 months, with weekly hearings
consisting of interviews with the defendant and the public presentation of significant amounts of
evidence against the accused.156 When compared to the Waldheim Trials, which involved the
sentencing of 3,400 individuals over a period of two months, the 1992 Leipzig trial appears
painfully thorough.157 In structure, this post-unification trial resembled those of former West
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Germany, with an emphasis placed on the accumulation of evidence and the establishment of an
evidentiary record. The similarities between unified German historical trials and their West
German predecessors point to a deliberate dismissal of East German legal values, as well as the
continued proliferation of the same legal and political values which informed West German
historical trials.
For example, like its West German predecessors, the 1992 Leipzig trial placed a
significant degree of importance on establishing an enduring evidentiary record. In West German
judicial trials, collecting and recording ample evidence over a long course of time was a tool to
legitimize these trails, and the Leipzig trial adopted the same mechanism.158 In her analysis of
the West German 1965 Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, historian Rebecca Wittmann describes the
grueling process of evidence accumulation which was required to indict an individual for
historical crimes committed during the war.159 It took upwards of five years for the West German
prosecutors to gather sufficient evidence to indict the accused Nazi criminals during the
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials. This evidence, which consisted of eyewitness testimony from 319
witnesses, was presented over the course of the 183-day long trial.160 Wittmann indicates that
upon the accumulation of this evidence, the trial proceedings depended on the presentation of
evidence and arguments from both sides, as well as the continued interrogation of the defendants,
with designated lawyers assigned to both the defending and prosecuting parties.161
The 1992 Leipzig trial followed a similar pattern. It took a total of two years for
prosecutor Bauer to gather enough evidence to indict Jürgens. This evidence included almost
every piece of documentation associated with the 1950 Waldheim Trials, including a prison
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report stating the miserable conditions that the Waldheim prisoners had been subjected to,
witness accounts of the barbaric treatment of the prisoners and the expedited trial proceedings, as
well as eye-witness accounts of the 32 executions in question.162 This extensive evidentiary base
not only allowed Bauer to indict Jürgens but also served as a legitimizing record of Jürgens’
crimes.
In the case of both the West German Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials and the unified German
Leipzig trial, the prosecuting teams placed a great deal of emphasis on the publication of
evidence in an effort to legitimize and record both the crimes which had been committed and
their claims against the perpetrators of those crimes. In the case of the West German Frankfurt
Auschwitz proceedings, the court went to great lengths to ensure that all 183 days’ worth of
proceedings and witness accounts were recorded and made publicly available.163 Today, records
of this trial remain publicly accessible through a free online portal, allowing these trials to go
down in history as one of Germany’s most poignant and public acts of self-examination.164 By
projecting this massive amount of evidence and trial documentation to the West German public
and preserving it for years to come, the West German government was demonstrating their
commitment to the preservation of victim testimony.
In a similar vein, the 1992 Leipzig trial was a distinctly public affair, with journalists
from across the nation reporting on the events of the trials as they unfolded. National newspapers
such as Die Tageszeitung, Der Spiegel and Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, as well as local
papers such as Die Leipziger Volkszeitung, all published multiple reports on the trials which
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detailed the events of the proceedings.165 The amount of evidence presented during the trial was
substantial, and, as with the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, victim testimony was paramount to the
Leipzig proceedings. The first six months of the trial were dedicated solely to witness testimony
about the horrors of the Waldheim Trials. According to reports by Die Tageszeitung on
December 12, 1992, the court recorded testimony from dozens of former Waldheim inmates who
were treated inhumanely at the hands of Jürgens and his fellow East German judges.166
One witness and victim, named Erwin Krombholz, was sentenced to 15 years in prison as
a “war criminal” in Waldheim on charges of “membership in the National Socialist underground
organization Wehrwolf.”167 Krombholz was sentenced without any evidence or opportunity for
defense and was tortured brutally upon his arrival at the prison. According to the court in
Leipzig, “as a convict, who has been deprived of a defendant’s due rights, he is instrumental in
taking evidence.”168 In this case, the phrasing “taking evidence” refers to the process of
constructing a case against Jürgens. The Leipzig court made an effort to put victim testimony at
the center of the trial proceedings, and the fact that this testimony was considered “instrumental”
in the process points to the unified German court’s dedication to the preservation of victims’
voices. Furthermore, the fact that this testimony was published so widely speaks, again, to the
state’s interest in establishing an evidentiary record that could legitimize the proceedings and
make sure the trial and its political lessons about liberal values of due process and evidence
accumulation entered the German public consciousness.
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These judicial norms stood in stark contrast to those of the East German state. East
German trials, which were the product of a wholly different political system, were largely
considered legitimate if they effectively represented and showcased the political values of the
Soviet state.169 In her discussion of East German war-crime trials after the fall of the Nazi
regime, historian Mary Fulbrook emphasizes that denazification and historical trials in East
Germany were considered successful if they demonstrated the power of the Soviet state.170 This
emphasizes the importance that the East German legal system placed on political performance.171
As historian Jeffrey Herf notes in his work Divided Memories: The Nazi Past in the Two
Germanies, it made sense that the East German Waldheim Trials did not involve the presentation
of significant amounts of evidence against the accused or the public exhibition of the trial
transcripts.172 Unlike their West and unified German counterparts, East German historical trials
such as the Waldheim Trials were not concerned with the establishment of an evidentiary record
and instead focused looked to the trial’s ability to function as propaganda tools as a measure of
legitimacy.173
These judicial values were not only dismissed but condemned outright by the victorious
West German state during unification.174 The fact that the structure of the 1992 trial bears a close
resemblance to West German trials, such as the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, indicates the new
state’s prioritization of the Western legal tradition after the fall of the wall. As Tageszeitung
reporter Julia Albrecht argued, the Leipzig trial aimed at criticizing the East German legal
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system and revealing its politicization and subsequent “bastardization of justice.”175 This critique
depends on a West German approach to justice, which prided itself on its neutrality and fairness.
Universally adopted liberal legal notions such as “judicial neutrality” and impartial
adjudication for unbiased sentencing were integral elements of German legal practices during the
unification period.176 In the case of the 1992 Leipzig trial, the extensive record gathered against
Jürgens, the significant time devoted to witness testimony, and the procedures followed during
the trial to ensure that Jürgens due process rights were upheld, all demonstrated the Leipzig
trial’s efforts to ensure that Jürgens had an objectively fair trial, in the liberal sense. According to
a journalist who attended the courtroom sessions, the prolonged deliberation and extensive
amount of evidence presented during the 1992 trial speak to the court’s dedication to “finding the
truth” and proving it in an objective manner.177 This emphasis on impartial sentencing stands in
stark contrast to the political “show trials” of East Germany, the most obvious example of which
were the Waldheim Trials.178
The Leipzig trial’s commitment to due process and desire to establish new legal norms
was perhaps most clear when, in a surprising twist during the third month of the trial, prosecutor
Bauer dropped the charges of murder due to a lack of evidence against Jürgens specifically. As a
press release published by the Leipzig District Court stated:
The accused 86-year-old judge could not be shown with absolute certainty that he actually
voted for the death penalty in 1950. Therefore, the legal principle applies "in dubio pro
reo" - in case of doubt for the accused, and the accusation of a legal violation and the severe
deprivation of liberty remains. 179
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As a secondary judge in the Waldheim cases, Jürgens' power in the courtroom was
limited to his ability to advise the primary judge, or chairman.180 As a result, it was difficult to
indict Jürgens as the primary orchestrator of the murder.
In place of the accusation of murder, Bauer shifted focus and brought two new official
charges against Jürgens, namely “perversion of justice” and “deprivation of liberty,” both of
which were not bound by a statute of limitations.181 In the early 1990s, it was quite common for
former GDR political and legal officials to be scrutinized for depriving Soviet citizens of their
right to “liberty” or for participating in judicial acts, such as show trials, which constituted a
“perversion of justice.”182 The very notion of a right to liberty is grounded in liberal notions of
civil rights. In this sense, this legal accusation was grounded in the political values of the new
liberal government. Similarly, as Peter Quint explains, the concept of a “perversion of justice” in
this context refers to “political justice,” which establishes a causal link between politicization
and judicial failure.183
This value of apolitical justice is a central tenet of the liberal legal tradition. Legal
scholars Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns state in their work History, Memory, and the Law
that “the classic, liberal conception of justice requires impartial adjudication of claims and
accusations.”184 This impartiality implies that the law should occupy a space above politics, a
notion which the majority of individuals in today’s liberal societies are familiar with. Therefore,
the transition from the charge of murder in the first degree to “perversion of justice” highlights

180

Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel "Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts," Journal of Legal Studies, January
1972.
181
Quint, The Imperfect Union, 95.
182
Ibid., 207.
183
Quint, The Imperfect Union, 207.
184
Sarat and Kearns, History, Memory, and the Law, 11.

Purvis 48
the 1992 trial’s function as a tool to establish new legal norms grounded in liberal values of
apolitical justice.
On August 26, 1993, prosecutor Bauer stood before the judges and the rows of reporters
eagerly waiting for his comments and presented his closing statement to the court.185 “It was a
state-sanctioned lynching,” Bauer said of the Waldheim Trials. “Nothing was proven, yet blood
ran down the street that night in Waldheim.”186 In this statement, and throughout the trial, the
prosecution focused heavily on the Waldheim Trial’s lack of due process in an effort to highlight
the lack of judicial integrity displayed by Jürgens and the legal system that supported him. While
the initial charge brought against Jürgens was that of premeditated murder, Bauer later focused
the majority of his argument against Jürgens on the lack of evidence presented during the
Waldheim Trials.
Bauer argued that the Waldheim Trials were purely political and conducted with the
intention of furthering the Soviet agenda, not achieving justice.187 In his conclusion, Bauer
emphasized that “mere membership in one of the various organizations during the Nazi era was
enough for a conviction.”188 This statement was designed to substantiate Bauer’s ultimate claim
that the trials were unjust because they had prioritized the Soviet political values over justice and
due process for individual defendants. Both local and international press reports on the trial
noted the lack of evidence and due process.189 Additionally, Bauer cited the “fast-track”
hearings which were exceedingly rushed and conducted “without witnesses, without evidence,
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and almost always without a defense lawyer.”190 The only cause for prosecution was a “protocol
handed down from the Soviets,” and very little regard was paid to the truth.191 This disregard for
“proper” and unbiased judicial procedure was at the core of Bauer’s argument against Jürgens. In
this closing statement, Bauer set a standard for judicial practices in unified Germany, a standard
which is dependent on the presence of an evidentiary record, apolitical sentencing, and due
process for the accused.

The Verdict
“Herr Jürgens, can you hear me?” On the 30th of August 1993, Leipzig Court judge
Wolfgang Helbig addressed defendant Jürgens with a note of concern in his voice.192 “I repeat,
Mr. Jürgens, can you hear me?” Silence, once more. After a gesture from Helbig, Jürgens’
lawyer clapped his hands right under his defendant’s nose. Finally, the accused Otto Jürgens, 86,
gestured in response: Yes, he hears. “Did you also hear the prosecutor's plea?” Again, silence.193
After another desperate glance from his council, Jürgens retrieved his hearing aid, which had
been resting on the table in front of him every day for the last 10 months, and reinserted it. After
a break in the negotiations, Helbig resumed proceedings with the assumption that Jürgens had
been able to follow the plea after the reinsertion of his, clearly necessary, hearing aid. “We shall
continue then with the reading of the verdict,” stated Helbig in a much more confident manner.
Jürgens looked exceedingly displeased.194
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After 10 months of hearings and deliberations, West German executive judge Wolfgang
Helbig reached a verdict and sentenced Jürgens to two years’ probation. Like prosecutor Bauer,
judge Helbig, who was 48 years old the time, was a practicing lawyer and judge in West
Germany and retained his position during unification, a luxury which most East Germans were
not afforded.195 In a final statement to the court and press, Judge Helbig explained his verdict:
According to the Leipzig Regional Court, the judge Otto Jürgens was involved in
the infamous Waldheim trials in 1950 in the conviction of more than 3,400
alleged war criminals. In rapid legal proceedings contrary to the rule of law, the
prisoners interned by the Soviet occupying powers were each sentenced in ten
minutes too long prison terms or to death. The Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) finds
Jürgens guilty of participating in the Waldheim Trials with deliberate disregard of
procedural rules and drastic impairment of the basic defense rights of the accused.
The sum of these willful violations of the law, each of which alone constitutes a
perversion of justice according to section 244 stGB-GDR (GDR Criminal
Code).196
In the end, the “perversion of justice” (Rechtsbeugung) charge stood out as the most
significant to the court. This was also the charge that West German and international newspapers
emphasized in their coverage of the trial.197 Articles in the British paper Reuters News and The
Associated Press place this charge, along with the “deprivation of liberty,” charge front and
center. In her article, “East German Judge Guilty of Perverting Justice in War Trials,”
Reuters News correspondent Bettina Vestring focused her analysis of the trial on the perversion
of justice charge and its link to political “show trials.”198 Similarly, Kevin Costelloe of The
Associated Press linked this charge to the assertion of liberal legal values of due process when he
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stated that the perversion of justice charge, among other aspects of the trial, indicated that “the
[unified German] government [had] taken pains to note that it [was] pursuing him for lack of due
process.”199 As this response indicated, the use of this charge underscored the new government’s
intentions to set new judicial standards through the performance of the 1992 Leipzig trial.
The Leipzig trial’s “perversion of justice” charge created a framework and pathway for
other trials in unified Germany designed to communicate new legal norms.200 In his work The
Imperfect Union, unification historian Peter Quint suggests that “thousands of cases of suspected
perversion of justice by former GDR judges have been investigated in Berlin alone.”201 The 1992
Leipzig trial was one of the first formal applications of this charge in Germany; it offered a way
for the newly-unified government to hold GDR criminals to account for the politically biased
nature of East German judicial practices.202 The desire to do so on the part of the unified German
government speaks to its commitment to establishing new legal norms grounded in values of
evidence accumulation and due process and illuminates the state’s intentions to use their legal
system as a tool in this political process.
The evolution of the perceived role of the law during this period of transition
reflects the integral relation between Germany’s legal system and political structure after
unification. When the political environment of a state goes through a transition such as
the unification process, the legal system follows suit.203 This concept of regime
dependent legal systems was at the core of Jürgens’ defense. In a statement made to East
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German newspaper Neues Deutschland after the verdict was declared, Jürgens stated that
he “felt that he had done nothing wrong.” He complained that “what was right back then
[in East Germany] could be wrong today.”204 Jürgens highlighted the fluidity of legal
norms in Germany and how those norms depended on the regime in power.
To conclude this chapter, it should be noted that, in the context of a politically turbulent
period such as unification, it seems odd to devote energy to a trial such as the one which
occurred in Leipzig in 1992. However, as this chapter argues, this trial served several important
political functions including facilitated the merger and the state-building process in unified
Germany by promoting western judicial ideals and condemning those of the east. The 1992
Leipzig trial functioned both as a manifestation of the unified German state’s liberal legal norms
and as an educational tool designed to proliferate West German values. As such, the trial itself
served as a site for conveying new legal and political norms structured around due process and
evidence accumulation. In this sense, the 1992 Leipzig trial illuminated the way in which the law
in unified Germany became part of the broader political processes of state-building.
Regardless of the political motivations behind the trial, the Leipzig investigation and
court events galvanized the German public. In the months leading up to the hearings, Otto
Jürgens’ story captured the nation’s attention, with journalists across Germany calling the
hearings a “unique historical event.”205 The next chapter will explore how the journalistic
coverage of the trial introduced divergent interpretations that largely depended on the politically
charged public sphere and the reporters’ orientations.
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Chapter 3
A Divided Public: The Reception of the 1992 Leipzig trial
“Quiet down back there!” Judge Wolfgang Helbig’s command echoed through the
wooden chamber in Room 115 of the Leipzig District Courthouse. This direction was aimed at a
group of older men, sitting in the back of the courtroom, murmuring disapprovingly as judge
Helbig read his verdict to the court.206 Former Waldheim Judge Otto Jürgens had been sentenced
to only two years’ probation on the charges of perversion of justice and the deprivation of
liberty.207 When Helbig announced the sentence, the men scoffed, prompting yet another
reprimand from the judge. Eventually, the old men removed themselves, slamming the door
angrily behind them.208
This group of men, who sporadically attended sessions of the 1992 Leipzig trial, were
most likely elder residents of the recently disbanded East German state.209 According to a
Tageszeitung journalist, who was present at the courtroom when the sentence was pronounced,
these elder East Germans had come to support Jürgens in his fight for freedom.210 In appearance,
these men resembled aged defendant Jürgens quite closely, and their disapproving murmurs and
occasional outbursts during prosecutor Bauer’s presentations showed that they disapproved of
the trial.211
By the end of the trial, the German public was profoundly divided about how to perceive
the verdict. Certain former East Germans viewed the trial as a manifestation of West German
triumphalism and a mere exercise of victor’s justice, while some former West Germans critiqued
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the trial for the leniency of Jürgens’ sentence and for what they perceived as its purpose as a
pedagogical tool designed to demonstrate the new state’s political ideologies. Whether this trial
functioned as a form of victor’s justice or as an educational tool, the German public recognized
the political goals of the 1992 Leipzig trial. This chapter explores the public critiques of the trial
and the political divide which defined them. The political debate engendered by the Leipzig trial
demonstrates that the trial functioned as an element of the state-building process in unified
Germany.

East German Perspective: Victor’s Justice Critique
The dissatisfied individuals who graced the courtroom in Leipzig that day represented a
much larger group of displaced former East Germans who felt personally threatened by the
unification process and, as a lawyer who I interviewed put it, the “West’s occupation of the
East.”212
Historian Andrew Bickford argues that former West German elites made use of many
“repressive” tactics, including selective hiring and disqualifying justice, to silence former East
Germans and strip them of any political voice or social mobility.213 The Tageszeitung journalist
noted that these harsher aspects of the unification processes, such as removing East German
officials from positions of power and the dismantling of East German businesses, left certain
former East Germans feeling displaced and resentful towards their new western government and
the unification process as a whole.214 This resentment towards the unification process was
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manifested through the critique of government-orchestrated trials, which occurred in the early
1990s and were designed to criticize the East German legal system.
At the heart of these critiques was the accusation of victor’s justice. This specific
accusation, which refers to the unjust prosecution of one party based on the political values of
another party, emphasizes the hypocritical and politically biased nature of the newly dominant
legal system.215 In their work History, Memory, and the Law, legal historians Austin Sarat and
Thomas Kearns argue that in the context of a democratic triumph over another ideology, such as
fascism or communism, this critique calls into question the objectivity of the new state’s legal
choices and serves as a criticism of the legal system itself.216
While this critique was eventually applied to the 1992 Leipzig trial, the first trial of this
nature to be criticized for victor’s justice was the 1991 Border Guard Trial. According to the
Tageszeitung journalist, many former East Germans viewed the Border Guards Trial, and
eventually the 1992 Leipzig trial, as “personal attacks” on East Germany and its values as a
state.217 Tina Rosenberg reports that some East Germans saw the Border Guard Trials simply as
a way for the West Germans to express their dominance over East Germans.218 Rosenberg cites
David Gill, a former East German government official, as having expressed that “the Wessis
(East German slang for West Germans) feel that they won history and can do what they want.”219
As Rosenberg put it, “to these individuals, the trial… was victor’s justice.”220 This demographic
was distressed by both the Border Guard Trial’s clear dismissal of the East German state’s legal
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system and its political legitimacy, and the press articles which covered the trials speak to this
critique.221 As this chapter goes on to discuss, former East Germans also interpreted the 1992
Leipzig trial as a manifestation of victor’s justice in that it used the law as a tool for Western
political gain. Therefore, the targeting of GDR criminal trials for perceived victor’s justice
represented a larger trend during the unification period, of which the Border Guard Trial and the
Leipzig trial were a part.
The unified German press quickly became an arena for the subtle expression of these
sentiments. In particular, former East German newspaper Neues Deutschland targeted these trials
and their outcomes as part of their critique of the unification process. Very few former East
German newspapers survived the dissolution of the East German state.222 However, as journalist
Charley Wilder wrote in his Der Spiegel article discussing East German de-legitimization during
unification, Neues Deutschland remained as one of the quintessential eastern leaning papers in
unified Germany and the most prominent source on the Eastern perspective during unification.223
Therefore, the way in which the 1992 Leipzig trial was discussed in this paper shines a light on
the eastern public’s response to the trial.
In the case of this paper, the reporters articulated a subtle version of the victor’s justice
critique by undermining the objectivity of the prosecution and emphasizing the innocence of the
defendant, in this case, Otto Jürgens. The articles published in Neues Deutschland at the time of
the trial focused a great deal on prosecutor Bauer’s western perspective, which had the effect of
implying that he was politically biased. Shortly after Judge Helbig announced his verdict in
1993, Neues Deutschland published a piece subtly critiquing the primary prosecutor and
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orchestrator of the trial. In the article, the unnamed author stressed Bauer’s identity by referring
to him as “aufgewachsene West-Jurist Bauer” (“the West German prosecutor Bauer”) and he
went on to restate Bauer’s political orientation and citizenship multiple times throughout the
piece, almost to the point of unnecessary repetition. 224
Similarly, another Neues Deutschland article published a few months later referred to
Bauer as a “West-Jurist,” or a “Western Judge.”225 Bauer’s upbringing and political orientation
were not reflected in any of the West German articles that were published at the same time.
According to a West German lawyer who I interviewed, the term “West-Jurist” in a publication
with East German origins is subtly derogatory in that it emphasizes the prosecutor’s political bias
where they should not be one.226 As one of my interviewees put it, this phraseology is “exactly
what I would expect from an East German paper.”227
Neues Deutschland’s emphasis on Bauer’s West German orientation was coupled with an
empathy for Otto Jürgens that reflected another subtle form of critique of the 1992 Leipzig trial.
A Neues Deutschland article from May 7th, 1993 raised questions about the prosecution and
Jürgens’ sentence by focusing on the testimony of one of the few witnesses in the trial who
defended the proceedings at Waldheim.228 Sixty-eight-year-old Helga Tiedt, who had worked as
a clerk during the Waldheim Trials, told the court that “the accused were treated properly, were
not beaten, were allowed to sit down and comment on the accusations against them.”229 Given
the well-documented nature of the Waldheim proceedings and the treatment of the prisoners--
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treatment that a 1950 Amnesty International Report described as “akin to an internment camp,”
Tiedt’s testimony was not particularly compelling.230 Yet, Neues Deutschland failed to include
the evidence that undermined Tiedt’s testimony.231 By placing her testimony front and center,
the article appears to be critiquing the 1992 trial as unfair and unnecessary, given the supposedly
“fair” treatment of Waldheim prisoners.
In the same vein of argumentation, several other Neues Deutschland articles pointed to
defendant Jürgens’ age as a way of underscoring the unnecessary nature of the trial. The majority
of a short article published on August 26th, 1993 focuses on a discussion of the defendant’s age
and frailty.232 As the first paragraph (of the two-paragraph article) read:
The 41st day of proceedings before the First Criminal Senate of the District Court of
Leipzig in the trial against the 86-year-old former Waldheim judge Otto Jürgens began
with a delay of two hours: the defendant's hearing aid failed to work and judge Wolfgang
Heibig had to get a replacement.233
In this context, Neues Deutschland painted a picture of Jürgens as a frail elderly man, and
this characterization made up the majority of the article.234 Another article from the same time
made note of Jürgens’ poor physical health, noting his “frail” physique and describing him as a
“poor old man,” as if his age or health status delegitimized his prosecution.235 Out of the more
than 20 articles published in Neues Deutschland about the trial, 18 of them included a substantial
discussion of Jürgens’ age and poor physical health.236 Although subtle, this focus encouraged
sympathy for Jürgens and suggested that the unified German prosecution was unnecessary.
The final technique that these articles used to highlight the western bias of the trial was to
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emphasize Jürgens’ personal perspective in a way that reinforced his innocence. The author of
one Neues Deutschland article introduced Jürgens by noting that he had “no criminal record”237
and highlighted Jürgens’ claim that he “did nothing wrong.”238 This sentiment was echoed in two
additional articles, one published in Neues Deutschland in 1992 and another in 1997. The earlier
article, entitled “Waldheim “-Richter: Ich war nicht SED-gelenkt,” (Waldheim Judge: I was not
controlled by SED) was entirely devoted to Jürgens’ defense.239 The article revolved around an
interview that took place at Jürgens’ house, making it the only article at the time to include an
interview with the defendant outside of the courtroom. As the title suggests, the article focused
on Jürgens’ belief that he was not a Soviet puppet, and his actions were entirely legal at the
time.240 Another article, published five years later, made the same argument about Jürgens’
innocence. The article, entitled “Ich Fühle Mich Nicht Schuldig” (“I do not feel guilty”), focused
entirely on Jürgens’ claim that his actions were legal under Soviet law and that he should not be
prosecuted.241 The combination of this East German paper’s extraordinary focus on Bauer’s
political perspective, Jürgens’ age, and the validity of his defense speaks to its criticism of the
unified German legal system’s political bias and the paper’s portrayal of Jürgens’ trial as a form
of West German victor’s justice. These critiques, however, were subtly expressed.
The standards for German media during unification prevented many journalists from
expressing their concerns about the trial more openly. According to the Tageszeitung journalist,
the press’ dedication to objectivity, whether they were Western or Eastern leaning in their
political orientation, prevented them from making any obvious claims for or against any
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particular political party.242 Therefore, it was rare to find newspaper articles that blatantly
critiqued the trials, and, as with the Neues Deutschland article, any hint of a political leaning had
to be quite subtle. As media historian Agnieszka Szymanska notes in her work “Do the Media
Really Support the German Reunification?,” the new German government at the time of
unification encouraged former East and West German press agencies to avoid biased writing in
an effort to prevent tensions which might arise from the merging of the two states.243 Szymanska
affirms that in the early 1990s, the media’s role was to facilitate unification by encouraging
unity, not sowing discord. 244 As a result, the Tageszeitung journalist insisted that those
journalists who were displeased by the trial either expressed their discordant beliefs subtly, as
was the case with Neues Deutschland articles or in private writings and conversations.245
This concern about openly expressing a critical opinion on these trials extended into the
private sphere as well. One elderly former East German man who told me that the 1992 trial was
an “obvious example of Western victor’s justice” insisted on remaining anonymous.246 This East
German’s request to remain anonymous more than thirty years after the trial is a noteworthy
example of a continued reluctance to criticize the western government openly.
The East German victors’ justice critique emphasized the way in which the 1992 trial was
influenced by the politics of unification. Coverage in Neues Deutschland suggests that the former
East German press found ways to subtly express their displeasure with the Western-oriented
unified German government and to portray the 1992 trial as a political tool designed to
delegitimize the East German legal system.
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Western Perspective: Leniency Critique
Former East Germans were not the only ones to criticize the 1992 Leipzig trial. Certain
West-leaning German citizens developed a very different critique of the trial. Rather than
offering sympathy towards the elderly Jürgens or suggesting he might be innocent, critiques from
the west focused on the leniency of Jürgens’ sentence. These individuals saw two years’
probation and a fine for a man who was originally indicted for murder as a very light sentence
and an unnecessarily tolerant response to what they viewed as the serious crimes committed at
Waldheim.247 These critics argued that the trial of Otto Jürgens was more of a political
performance, designed to establish the state’s new political and legal values than a criminal trial
held to punish East German offenders. 248
The leniency critique, which was pioneered primarily by former West Germans,
suggested that the unified German government was unable to properly prosecute Jürgens as a
criminal because of its political agenda and commitment to the unification and state-building
processes. The verdict, which was only two-years-probation and a fine of 6000 Deutsche Marks,
allowed Jürgens to essentially walk free and, as Tageszeitung reporter Julia Albrecht put it, “take
the train back to his home in Halle” the day he was convicted.249 To some former West Germans
and East German defectors, this was insufficient punishment for what was originally a murder
charge. This critique had a similar effect to the East German’s claim of victor's justice in that it
highlighted the unified German government’s use of the trial as a political tool, in this case, to
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encourage cooperation and establish new legal norms grounded in the democratic ideology of the
new state.
This argument, made primarily by West German journalists, may be valid in the context
of the unified German state’s push for amnesty for former East German officials.250 On April 22,
1993, Prominent SED (Socialist Democratic Party) official Egon Bahr, requested amnesty for all
GDR criminals in an effort to accelerate the “inner unification” process in Germany.251 These
amnesty discussions formed the political backdrop for the 1992 Leipzig trial, and Jürgens’
sentence, which was declared the same year as Bahr’s call for amnesty, was most likely
influenced by this political motivation to encourage unity and grant amnesty.
Unified Germany was not the only state that deployed amnesty as an approach to
facilitate transitional justice and the construction of a new state and body politic. Historian
Martha Minow cites the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was
established after the nation's break from Apartheid, as an example of the effective capacity of
amnesty and forgiveness to build bridges and unite a nation under its new leadership.252
Similarly, historian Paloma Aguilar cites the transition of power which occurred in Spain after
the death of fascist dictator Francisco Franco as the optimal opportunity to move on and forget
the crimes of the past. In her monograph Memory and Amnesia, Aguilar argues that if a conflict
arises within a nation regarding the nature of past events, it is “almost impossible to build a
common future, or achieve social harmony and political stability.”253 These analyses further
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illuminate the possible social complications which the unified German government had to
consider when making the choice to pursue criminal prosecution in place of amnesty.
Despite these calls for amnesty, West German-leaning media outlets still scrutinized
certain unified German judicial trials for their leniency. At the end of May 1993, a year after
Jürgens’ trial began, former East German president Hans Modrow was convicted for election
fraud committed during his time in office, and his light sentence was just as unpopular.254
Similarly to Jürgens, Modrow was sentenced to a “caution” (Verwarnung), which is the lightest
possible sentence for a criminal charge.255 In response to public complaints, the German Federal
Court (Die Bundesgerichtshof) repealed the mild judgment on the grounds that Modrow’s actions
were deliberately nefarious.256
In a public statement, the court noted that “it was the goal of the electoral manipulation to
cover up the real number of opposing votes…in order to suppress the extent of the dissenting
electorate that had turned against...the oppressive control of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of
Germany).”257 The West German-dominated Federal Court emphasized the extent of Modrow’s
wrongdoing in hopes of securing a more significant sentence. However, upon re-sentencing,
Modrow still avoided imprisonment, receiving instead a sentence of nine months’ probation. 258
According to Quint, this sentence did not satisfy those who had called for the initial
resentencing.259 However, the judge’s leniency did serve a political purpose in the context of
reunification. Given that Modrow’s sentence was read only a month after some of the initial calls
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for amnesty were first expressed, it is likely that his trial functioned more as a performative
declaration of the state’s intention to facilitate unification than a punitive trial.260
The responses to Modrow’s sentencing set the stage for the 1992 Leipzig trial and its
leniency critique. As was the case with the East German critique, the West German analysis of
the 1992 Leipzig trial as too lenient was most clearly expressed in the press. In order to
emphasize the leniency of the trial, western leaning newspapers such as the Nürnberger
Nachrichten and Der Spiegel focused their coverage of the trial on the illegality and severity of
Jürgens’ crimes at Waldheim in order to establish the need for a serious legal response.
However, in the end, the trial was critiqued for its failure to serve this purpose.
An article in the Nürnberger Nachrichten, one of Germany’s largest regional newspapers
based in Nuremberg, emphasized defendant Jürgens’ guilt in the face of the charges.261 Jürgens,
the paper wrote, “was able to see the illegality of his actions, yet he chose to commit the crimes,
which he did intentionally.”262 Furthermore, Jürgens did so without “showing a sense of guilt”
(Schuldbewußtsein zeigt er nicht).263 This characterization of Jürgens as guilty and worthy of
criminal prosecution contrasts strongly with the East German interpretation of Jürgens and the
trial itself. This characterization, which is echoed in several other articles published in the
Nürnberger Nachrichten, did the work of establishing the severity of Jürgens’ criminality, which
was glossed over in East German newspapers at the time, so as to underscore the need for a
verdict which matched the crime. As expressed in another western leaning newspaper, Der
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Spiegel, the 1992 trial failed to accomplish this necessary purpose which underscored its lenient
nature. 264
At the time of the trial, Der Spiegel published pieces that focused heavily on the abuses
which occurred during the Waldheim Trials in order to underscore the need for significant
judicial repercussions. An article published in Der Spiegel described the Waldheim Trial as
being “among the darkest chapters in German justice.” 265 The unnamed author followed this
characterization with an in-depth discussion of the abuses which occurred at Waldheim,
including the intentional “murder” of 32 victims.266 Similarly, another article published in Der
Spiegel in 1992 described Jürgens’ crimes in detail, claiming that Jürgens and his fellow judges
were “blood judges” (“Blutrichter”) and that “blood actually flowed” on the night of the
murder.267 In this sense, the newspaper focused on the severity of Jürgens’ crimes by accepting
Bauer’s interpretation of the death-sentences as murder, therefore establishing the need for a trial
that addressed these injustices.
However, according to this western-leaning newspaper, the 1992 trial failed in this
regard. At the end of the article, the author characterized the 1992 trial as a “fruitless attempt to
legally deal with injustice.”268 The author made this claim before the verdict was read. However,
to the author, it was clear that the charge of “murder,” although legitimate in their eyes, would be
dropped in favor of a less significant change. The author correctly predicted this development in
the trial but was so sure of the trial’s lenient and performative nature that they published this
critique a year before the verdict was even announced.269
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These subtle critiques of the trial’s necessary, yet lenient, nature were further
substantiated by articles published in western-leaning law journals at the time. Unlike
newspapers such as Der Spiegel and Neues Deutschland, unified German law journals were
much more forthcoming in their reaction to the trials that took place as part of the unification
process.
In an article published shortly after the conclusion of the Leipzig trial in the Frankfurtbased legal journal Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW), for example, West German legal
analyst Ernst Wolf described Helbig’s sentencing as “ineffective” given that it illustrated the
Federal Court’s willingness to “overlook the gross human rights violations exhibited during the
Waldheim Trials.”270 Wolf emphasized the magnitude of Jürgens’ crimes and accused Helbig
and the Federal Court of settling on a sentence that did not reflect the seriousness of his actions.
Wolf argued that the lenient sentence was most likely in service of the unification process, as the
new government was primarily concerned at this point with smoothing over East and West
German relations during the unification of the two states.271 The sentence, he charged, aimed to
facilitate relations between former East and West Germany.272 But, as Wolf saw it, this political
purpose “did not warrant the dismissal of a crime such as Jürgens’.” The lenient sentence
demonstrated an “inappropriate” degree of politicization.273 It made clear that Jürgens’ trial was
a political performance that prioritized facilitating unification over, as Wolf put it, the “honest
realization of justice.” 274
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Similarly, in 1995, legal analyst Günter Bemmann published an article in the westernoriented legal journal Juristen Zeitung that critiqued the 1992 verdict for its leniency.
Throughout the article, Bemmann referenced the trial’s “inadequacy” and critiqued the
Bundesgerichtshof (the district court) for its failure to achieve justice through such “forgiving”
sentencing.275 In a brief analysis of this article, Peter Quint refers to Bemmann’s piece as a
“bitter attack on [the verdict] for its leniency to the GDR judges and its willingness to accord
some respect to the GDR judicial system.”276 In the context of western-leaning legal journals,
which were less widely available to the public, the critiques of the trial’s leniency were much
more obvious. Whether it was through a focus on the significance of the crimes at Waldheim and
the need for an equally significant legal response or the outright identification of the trial
proceedings and insufficient, the local western response to the 1992 Leipzig trial was concerned
with issues of leniency.
This critique, however, highlights an especially significant political function of the 1992
Leipzig trial. As Quint points out, the Leipzig trial was being used by the unified German
government “for purposes of public education.”277 As a trial of a trial, Jürgens’ proceedings
simultaneously called into question the legitimacy of the East German state’s legal practices and
set a standard for how trials should be done in the future.
Coverage in newspapers with West German origins highlighted the educational role of
the 1992 trial. According to historian Mary Fulbrook, in moments of political transition, an
important part of the establishment of new legal and political norms is the public dismissal of
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those of the previous regime.278 Certain western-leaning German newspapers appear to have
served this political function. A Nürnberger Nachrichten article published at the time of the trial
made a point of criticizing not only Jürgens but the East German legal system itself.279 By
describing Jürgens and as one of two “People's judges” who “were the semi-skilled, politically
trained helpers of the chairmen in trials like those at Waldheim,” the article cast dispersions on
the East German legal system, its organization, and its legitimacy. 280 This critique of Jürgens
and the East German state served to bolster the legitimacy of the unified German legal system
and the government’s intentions to prosecute Jürgens.
International media commentary on the Leipzig trial, while scant, also functioned as a
public condemnation of the East German legal system.281 A piece by Bettina Vestring for British
outlet Reuters News described Jürgens as having been “inadequately trained in the law, having
failed his examinations twice. He was eventually made a prosecutor and judge nonetheless.”282
This criticism served to undermine the legitimacy of the East German legal system while
propping up that of the newly unified state.
In this sense, the 1992 trial functioned as an educational tool designed to proliferate the
values of the new government and facilitate the unified German state-building process.283 Mary
Fulbrook argues that the act of establishing new standards of justice and undermining those of
the previous regime aids in the formation of a new state.284 Historians who have studied East
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and West German state-building processes note how the two states used their legal systems to
legitimize their political and judicial efforts, especially regarding the treatment of the Holocaust,
through trials such as the Waldheim and Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials.285 This legacy of trials as
political tools in moments of transition informed the German unification process as well, making
the establishment of new legal norms and the rejection of past ones essential aspects of the
unified German state-building process.
In the context of a broader discussion of transitional justice trials around the world, Peter
Quint cites the 1992 Leipzig trial as a quintessential example of a performative, political trial.286
This is especially significant given that one of Leipzig prosecutor Bauer's main critiques of the
Waldheim trials was its politically performative nature. It is this paradox that makes the Leipzig
trial an especially interesting historical occurrence. While the trial did not necessarily unite the
German people in a time when the government was calling for unity, it did send a clear message
about the unified German government’s approach to both remembering the past and building a
future. It was indeed, as Der Spiegel put it, a “unique historical event.”287
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Conclusion
Decades after unification, the use of trials as vehicles for political expression is alive and
well in modern-day Germany. After Chancellor Angela Merkel made headlines with her
unprecedented acceptance of nearly a million migrants and refugees into German territory during
the Syrian refugee crisis, German public backlash from far-right parties has produced a
contentious political landscape.288 In the midst of this tension, the German government, which
has remained liberal and democratic, used its legal system as a tool to express a new standard for
the treatment of German citizens.
In 2013, 20 years after the conclusion of the Leipzig trial, the government orchestrated
yet another historical trial, this time targeting an underground Neo-Nazi coalition. The trial,
known colloquially as the National Socialist Underground (NSU) Trial, was conducted between
2013 and 2018 by the Munich Higher Regional Court and aimed to address several crimes
committed by the NSU terrorist group, most notably a series of murders targeting suspected
immigrants and refugees.289 According to Philip Olterman of the Guardian, the trial was the
longest and most expensive trial in German history.290
Like the 1992 Leipzig trial, the NSU Trial was designed to teach a political lesson in the
midst of societal unrest. In a nation that has come to define itself by its treatment of the past,
denouncing the Nazi party remains as necessary today as it was in 1945.291 Even though this
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modern trial differs from the Leipzig trial in a number of regards, both trials were designed to
send a message about the German state’s political evolution and treatment of historical crimes.
On February 23rd, 2012, in the direct wake of the NSU murders, Chancellor Angela Merkel held
an official state ceremony in commemoration of the victims.292 As part of the ceremony, which
was broadcast across the country, Merkel called for the banning of the NSU and for a trial to
bring them to justice. As Merkel expressed in her speech, this trial was designed to showcase the
democratic nation’s intolerance of Neo-Nazi behavior and the German state’s tremendous
political progress since the Second World War.293 Therefore, the NSU trial was orchestrated to
both achieve justice for the victims of these hate crimes and to broadcast the nation’s political
evolution. In this sense, the NSU trial functioned quite similarly to the 1992 trial. The 1992
Leipzig trial set a precedent for the German state’s use of legal trials as arenas for the expression
of political sentiments, and the NSU trial was a future manifestation of this legacy.
The 1992 Leipzig trial was a critique of the East German legal system, deliberately
crafted to aid in the establishment and unification of the new state. As this thesis has shown, the
Leipzig trial functioned both as a condemnation of the East and as an expression of the unified
German state’s Western-leaning legal values. The expression of these values was intended to aid
in the establishment and unification of the new state under shared principles of democratic
governance and law.
The politically divisive responses to the trial raise questions about whether the trial
effectively united the German people. Yet, as the divisive responses illuminate, the trial did
accomplish the goal of projecting a message about new legal standards in unified Germany.
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Whether it functioned as a vehicle for victor’s justice or as an educational tool, the former East
and West German communities agreed that the 1992 Leipzig trial was more than a traditional
criminal trial. As a product of a hectic transitional period, the Leipzig trial conveyed political
lessons about new legal norms in a time when these lessons were necessary elements of the statebuilding process.294
As a trial of a trial, the proceedings at Leipzig could also be interpreted as an expression
of the German state’s focus on the past and its treatment in the present. Although the available
sources aren’t conclusive, it seems possible that this particular case was granted federal and
public attention at the time because, in part, it could be used to convey political lessons about
how the new state intended to grapple with the Holocaust. The treatment of Nazi crimes has
remained a cornerstone of German national identity since the end of the Second World War, and
as the NSU trial demonstrates, it is still a point of discussion in modern-day Germany.295
Whether the trial aimed to criticize the East German treatment of the Holocaust, its
judicial practices, or both, the 1992 Leipzig trial set a precedent for future use of the German
legal system as an arena for national introspection and legal critique. The law is an everfluctuating construct that is shaped by the political system in which it is executed. Trials, such as
those that occurred in unified Germany, thus offer an important window into the political
complexities of a historical era.
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